Miss Universal Values

Miss Universe China Bikini Competition, photo by Emma Zhang

The band was playing Cocaine as the small entourage entered but it was highly doubtful any of them would ever touch the stuff: these were international representatives of China, “athletes” in a land of contradictions, competing for fresh spoils.

After years of half-organized humiliations, the country is determined to seize an unusual new prize this September: Miss Universe, a controversial trophy offered by a US organization headed by the failed Presidential candidate and China-basher, Donald Trump.

The stiffly embossed invitations to the after-party offered the opportunity to “mingle with stars, celebrities and Beijing’s elite” but, despite the dozens desperate for a moment, or ideally a picture, next to one, none of those at the centre of this civilized scrum were remotely famous (yet). They are the finalists from this year’s Miss Universe China – the grand pageant, an impressively well-organized, if somewhat dull, event in Beijing’s Mastercard Center, had just finished.

For a country that describes itself as traditional and conservative, China has beauty contests seemingly every month: Miss World is now regularly held each year in Sanya, seaside city on the island province of Hainan,   also home to the local government’s Bikini Beauty Contest every July. Shanghai has its Miss Bikini of The Universe contest, while Chengdu is due to host this year’s Miss International Beauty Pageant. And there are dozens of other flesh parades at a lesser-known provincial venues . Some are corrupt, casting-couch affairs, organized for nefarious reasons – as PR for a provincial official’s new (illegal) golf course, in the case of one described to me last year, in unglamorous Shanxi Province.

Others are not so welcome: Mr Gay China was treated to an embarrassing police raid in front of world media in 2009 and the competition hasn’t been heard from since.

But if televised extravaganzas such as the Beijing Olympics are an example of how the state is able to orchestrate world-class events to its exact specifications, this year’s Miss Universe can be viewed as the private sector’s ambition to do just the same, albeit with government approval, on a smaller scale, and with a blizzard of confetti replacing climactic fireworks.

The local cast list at Miss Universe China 2011 was eclectic, unusual and – as the invitation curtly reminded – “elite.” We had judge Tony Li, both flamboyant TV star and owner of the hair salon chain Tony Studios, non-coincidentally one of the sponsors.  There, prowling the cocktail circuit like Steppenwolf, was judge Zhang Huan, a performance artist who divides his time between New York and Shanghai. Earlier, we saw arrive on the red carpet the tall, slender supermodel known simply as Du Juan, Vogue’s first Asian cover star.

Leading them all was Miss Universe’s National Director, Yue-Sai Kan, (or Kan Yue-Sai), the cosmetics queen of China, who helped changed the faces of Chinese women in the 1980s  by introducing them to make-up – her make-up, Yue-Sai Cosmetics, to be precise. After 1989, or so the story goes, the government made her pretty much responsible for turning women away from the drably natural look of the Maoist era and start getting them in front of their vanity units.  She is one of several women who are sometimes tritely called “China’s Oprah Winfrey.”

Lingering at the outskirts were ageing members of the Beijing’s Eurotrash contingent. The Madoff lookalikes watched proceedings with much younger companions – who were they, one wondered, and, in a city where smog forever eclipses the sun, where did they get their magnificent tans?

From France, perhaps: Chateaux Margaux, the prestige French label that now sees its luxury bottles knocked down and knocked off by China’s emergent upper-middle classes, had put their general manager, Paul Pontalier, at Miss Universe’s disposal. Thanking the contestants and describing his initial perplexity at Margaux being called a “feminine wine,” Pontalier claimed he now finally understood the appellation.

“It’s about beauty, elegance, subtlety, sensuality, charm… and power… we must never forget how powerfulthese women are,” uttered Pontalier, who’d flown in from Paris that day to offer a scene of Gallic gratitude that veered close to parody. “This is the result of gifts from nature… from genes.”

“These women are dangerous!” exclaimed Kan in response.

*

Prior to the foundation of the People’s Republic, private ‘beauty contests’ took place in brothels – or for the benefit of emperors – on a regular basis. Mao’s takeover in 1949 initially seemed quite a positive thing, at least for women’s civil rights. Prostitution was outlawed, make-up and other bourgeoisie influences were condemned as unrevolutionary and women went to work next to men in the factories. Both genders were clad in the sexless “Mao suits” that characterized the period up until 1978 – women even sewed patches on their clothes to make them look older.

After Deng’s reforms, the old vices and new iniquities reappeared almost immediately. Prostitution returned with a vengeance – as well as its more innocent counterparts. “In fact, beauty contests in China during the 1980s were even more popularized than today,” said Fang Gang, Director of the Institute of Sexuality and Gender Studies at the Beijing Forestry University and author of Beauty Contests in China.

Initially, China’s Confucian streak revolted against the phenomenon. Leading the charge were the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF), who pressured lawmakers to uphold the country’s traditional values, forbid any official involvement and limit media reporting on them. In 1988, Beijing Television attempted to hold the first televised contest, which was eventually cancelled, and as late as 2002, police shut down a bathing-suit pageant in southern China mid-way through, saying it was against ‘regulations.’

But by then, the horse had long bolted the stable and was, in fact, in the process of being groomed for international success. The state first got involved in 1991, sending a contestant to the Elite Model Look contest. The reason was perfectly simple: the government was persuaded it would boost the country’s textile and fashion industry. “The power behind [them] is still economic benefit,” Fang said. “A beauty contest is fundamentally a business event – just look at the amount of sponsorships it claims.”

The real turning point, though, was in 2003, when the State Tourism Administration and the Foreign Ministry approved the first government-sponsored contest. It was held, ironically enough, in Shandong Province – the birthplace of Confucius. It was also China’s first Miss Universe. That year, state-owned news agency Xinhua reported on the growing popularity of beauty pageants, quoting Li Fangran, a female clerk at Beijing Agricultural Bank, saying ”Showing your beauty and slim figure in public is the freedom and right of women. It has nothing to do with moral standards.”

*

Miss Universe is not a competition in the usual sense: a clash between rival abilities. It’s more a spot-the-difference contest, where the girl who makes one wins. Think of a Miss California heat (the audience at the final didn’t have to: a soft-focus montage of weeping, white Misses Universe, recalling what seemed a bygone era, was screened intermittently throughout) and the parade of near-identikit blondes, brunettes and in-betweens, all boasting the same sunkissed skin and gleaming fixed smiles. Then remove those differences.

“They all look the same,” said Emma, who accompanied me with camera, when asked who she favored. Admittedly, this was the bikini round, where everyone wore blue and looked tall, skinny and dazzlingly similar. Then again, we also were in the front row, which afforded the best possible viewing, as well as frathouse-style commentary from a trio of suited, white businessmen behind (“She’s such a babe,” observed the CEO of the Chinese arm of a major American investment bank. “That’s the one with the ass,” his friend vouchsafed).

The banker redefined his stance after he asked for Emma’s number, then clocked her press badge. “Don’t you think this is utterly degrading to women?” he suddenly wondered, before requesting anonymity. It was a question I later put to Madam Kan, to near-disastrous effect.

Back then, though, my thoughts were with one of the models, Aliya, a 21-year-old from Xinjiang Province studying preventative medicine at Fudan University, who I’d spoken to earlier that week. Articulate and thoughtful, Aliya was not particularly concerned about actually winning (“It’s a game for me. I try… but the result isn’t very important,” she shrugged) and defied the feminist cliché of the docile beauty contestant, unwitting dupe to the male gaze.

Aliya is also a Uyghur, a Muslim in a country that, despite (often literally) boasting 56 ethnic nationalities, essentially views itself as both atheist and Han. “Most Muslims don’t want girls to join these competitions,” she started by saying. That’s a serious understatement: Islamic fundamentalists literally ran riot before the Miss World finals in 2002 in Nigeria, leaving 200 dead and 500 injured. “It’s a big problem for me… I don’t want to talk about it,” she admitted.

I was rooting for Aliya partly because I’d met her, partly because I actually recognized her on stage and partly because, as an ethnic minority, she would be an underdog, despite her looks. Beauty contests are intrinsically linked to national, ethnic and, particularly, gender identity. Such political demarcations behind images of feminine beauty are undeniable when China protests and meddles in events such as Miss Tibet and Miss Taiwan. I doubted Aliya would be able to escape the ‘taint’ of her troubled province.

“I didn’t want to join at first because, maybe, they [the judges, presumably] don’t think I’m like Chinese because I’m a minority… but why can’t I represent my country? I am part of it and I am a different look. I can represent a different Chinese girl.” Despite her noble intentions, Aliya didn’t place in the top ten, though when I mention her name to Yue-Sai Kan, she enthused about her in the same rapturous terms she referred to all the others (“delicious, like an ice cream!” was one memorable phrase).

So what were “they” looking for exactly? Zhang Huan, the artist cum judge, dresses with the kind of confidence that only comes from success (or self-delusion), like a chic migrant worker, or Brother Sharp, the hobo who became a fashion icon in China after his picture was posted online last year. Zhang’s ideal was “a ‘post-natural… combination of future and nature [where] nature, umm, refers to the concept of inner beauty… a beautiful person should have an unsophisticated sort of quality, which should be futuristic at the same time, so that it surpasses the traditional concept of simplicity” – all of which makes you wonder what Zhang was doing acting as a judge for Miss Universe.

How did he expect anyone to measure up to this? “I didn’t find a beauty that met my standard today,” he sighed. Could anyone, though? “Oh, I’ve never thought about that actually… although I’m sure there must be someone!”

Luo Zilin, China's Miss Universe entrant, after watching a surgical operation in Sao Paolo

Luo Zilin, China’s Miss Universe entrant, after watching a surgical operation in Sao Paolo – image by Emma Zhang

Whoever that someone was, China won’t be sending her to the final. Zhang seemed fairly disappointed at the board’s chosen winner, Luo Zilin, who “cannot represent Chinese women today… she’s too Westernized, her body, her feeling, her temperament, it’s all too Westernized.”

As for China’s dreams of winning this year: “No chance.”

Judge and Artist Zhang Huan with Miss Universe Entrant

Judge and Artist Zhang Huan with Miss Universe Entrant – image by Emma Zhang

*

Back in 2003, many were worried about the effect beauty contests would have on society; there were particular fears that women would turn to plastic surgery, lengthening legs and widening eyes, in order to achieve Western beauty ideals. These worries turned out to be correct: in 2004, China saw its first Miss Plastic Surgery competition, which requires a doctor’s certificate proving the work – the winner gets 50,000 Yuan ($6,000).

But today, Director Kan thinks Chinese women have mostly caught up with their peers in the West and are less distinguishable from them in almost every way, barring education.“Today’s Chinese girls… in many ways are very much like a woman in Hong Kong, Taiwan or, in some instances, America even, because they’ve been exposed to the same thing,” she claimed. “A lot of them wear almost the same clothes… listen to the same music… but actually, when you really get down a little bit, they’re actually are lacking a lot of the world view.”

A woman of fame and influence, Kan had nevertheless been courteous enough to keep me waiting only half an hour to speak to her. Fresh from her interviews with Japanese media, she obligingly retold the story, for what must be the thousandth time, of how she built her brand like it’s a fresh tale for her.

Despite her personal success story, though, the balance of power between the sexes in China remains almost institutionalized, especially in rural areas. In Wuhan, Hubei province in June, another, creepier type of beauty contest was taking place, one that neatly formalized this arrangement. Wealthy, single businessmen paid 99,999 yuan (US$15,435) for a day-long “dating convention” to meet potential girlfriends. The latter’s entry fee simply required they be good looking – most women chose to wear swimsuits. The men wore suits. Organizers didn’t bother to defend that, arguing the women were judging the men simply by their material prospects and not their looks.

So beauty, like athleticism or a high net worth, simply becomes something to be traded. “It’s like the Olympics,” said Miss Kan of her competition. “Course it is! How many things [do] you know where the contestant can actually wear the name of Miss China, with a crown. How many competitions are there on a recent international scale? Is there any difference?”

She argued that beauty contests are no different to athletics events (even if the event seems to be show jumping). If athletes are celebrated by virtue of their physical prowess – selling their bodies to sport, so to speak – why should her stable of starlets be treated any differently?

In order to prepare what she referred to as her “athletes” for the task, all 32 were sent to an intensive training course – “Booty Camp,” as a friend neatly put it – where, under Kan’s oversight, they woke at 7am and worked till 11pm, learning the rigors of deportment, spoken English, posing and applying cosmetics (“Their make-up was perfect – they all used Yue-Sai cosmetics!” Kan noted delightedly).

Yue Sai Kan and Consort

Yue Sai Kan and Consort – image by Emma Zhang

The determination to regain face for the country, after so many years of failures is evident. The competition’s slogan for this year patriotically proclaims “Celebrating Chinese women, bringing glory to China,” though, tellingly, only the first part has been translated to English. If the winner goes onto win the worldwide final in September, it will be like adding another medal to China’s Olympics collection.

“Like if an athlete gets a gold medal, what’s so bad about that? She’s an athlete too, we train her like a horse… what’s so demeaning about that?” The defensive manner was the result of a fairly innocent question posed earlier, when, after some preamble, I asked how she would have replied to the aforementioned banker, who said the contest was degrading.

The atmosphere got slightly less cozy. “Who said that?” she demanded. “I don’t know how this idiot could have said something like that!” She went on to list the charitable achievements of Rio Mori, the Japanese winner of Miss Universe 2007 who was one of this year’s judges in China and Petra Nemcova, another judge and model, whose experience of the 2004 Asian tsunami inspired her to establish children’s charity the Happy Hearst Trust, concluding, “There may be other events that are demeaning to women but I guarantee you, that night, I would say that 99% of people would say we elevate women to a very high point.”

Zhang Huan also didn’t think the image on display was anything but positive for his country: “I think it represented the modern Chinese people’s hopes and dreams of women, especially young women. I think it did.”

“These beauty contests are reflections of the traditional societal gender system,” observed the expert, Fang.  “Whatever pretty name is used, they can’t cover their nature of treating women as commodities to consume and enjoy.”

The accusation didn’t go away and it seemed surprising, given the cheesy reputation of Miss Universe, now run since 2002 by Trump, that it should have offended Kan so much. Was her indignation merely a front – or are Chinese values of femininity (and feminism) simply different?

Probably the two prevailing stereotypes of Chinese woman – in the West, at least – are the “dragon lady,” the kind of no-nonsense power madam recently given lease of life by the “Tiger Mother” controversy, and the courtesan, once epitomized by Suzy Wong and the culture of the concubine. Kan was certainly capable of breathing a little fire (“That man deserves to be punched!”) but was otherwise very amiable. Her contestants may have smiled passively on stage but, as the case of Aliya from Xinjiang showed, most were perfectly capable of holding their own off it.

Perhaps one difference is a sense of pragmatism over lofty idealism. “There are lots of so-called feminist women who don’t do anything,” said Kan scornfully. “Yet Miss Universe this year raised something like… 68 million dollars for [good causes]… what’s wrong with that?”

Is Kan a feminist herself? “Yes, but… in a different kind of sense. Everything I have done is pioneering and my success did not come because… my father is some kind of Chinese leader… everything came from zero. But I believe women should be feminine.” Here she referred to a kind of traditional, Confucian ideal instilled by her mother, where women behave demurely, deferring perhaps in public but getting things done privately –like building up a business empire or running global brands like Miss Universe.

“That’s why that comment was very offensive to me and it is not even correct,” Kan said, still slightly fuming as we finished up. “From the get-go, that is the last thing we had in mind… How can we celebrate Chinese women if we demean Chinese women?”

*

On the subject of pragmatism and material values: Miss Universe is similar to one of those quiz shows where nobody goes home empty-handed. 31 of the contestants may not make it to Sao Paolo, Brazil for the big autumn final but they still got plenty of prizes, such as cameras, shoes, clothing, make-up (no prizes for guessing whose), hi-fi equipment, dental treatment and English lessons. Include the holiday in Beijing and whirlwind of promotions and it’s not such a bad return for a girl from the provinces, for a bit of bikini modeling.

The winner, Luo Zilin, also receives a year-long contract with YSK Promotions, which includes a “personal chaperone,” plus the trip to Brazil and she gets to keep her LukFook crown, valued (by the jeweler) at 2.8 million yuan (just under $450,000).

We also got to keep a little something. Back at home, I unpacked the party’s goodie bag. Among the usual promotional materials (a heavy brochure from Mercedes went straight for recycling) were a large bottle of expensive foreign perfume, some lingerie, a free dental check-up at a top Beijing clinic and clothes vouchers for a women’s boutique. Altogether, not a bad haul – especially if you’re a woman. But that’s what Miss Universe is supposed to be about: beauty as commodity, packaged and exported and thoroughly modern.

“It’s definitely not progressive,” argued gender expert Fang. “But I wouldn’t say it’s devolving either, because there is just no ‘progressive’ sex equality or sex recognition [in China]. I would say it’s a reflection of diversity. Personally, I think even something that is academically criticised should be able to exist too. Everyone has the right to choose his or her own lifestyle, which includes being appreciated, consumed or even purchased.”

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City Sun, the “undercover” paper

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As commercial papers look for ways to hook readers’ interest, the City Sun (城市信报) appears to have found a reliable strategy: sending its reporters undercover.

“UNDERCOVER” shouts the headline to the March 29 edition of the paper (shown above), which features a first-hand look at a six-day package vacation in Hainan that attracted tourists with low prices up-front but piled on the fees during the trip.

The City Sun, a commercial daily based in Qingdao, Shandong Province, has been conducting regular undercover investigations of poorly-behaving enterprises ranging from the food service industry and hospitality to manufacturing and home repair. The paper’s enthusiasm for sting operations attracted the attention of Douban user “lomoo”, who set up a gallery of images earlier this week.

August 22: Undercover at Haidilao

This week alone the paper has run three undercover cover features:

  • Monday August 22: Haidilao, the hotpot chain at the center of a fraud scandal. The paper confirmed that the chain uses stock from concentrate and short-weights certain meats, but sanitary conditions seem to be worlds better than the hotpot restaurants it covered last October.
  • Tuesday August 23: Food delivery services. Flagrant misuse of leftovers and reuse of fry oil.
  • Thursday August 25: Small inns. Working as a cleaner, the paper’s reporter found that tea cups were rinsed with bleach, and bedclothes were reused without being washed. The feature story, while not exactly an undercover investigation, involves a reporter’s account of working as an extra at Hengdian World Studios.

Headlines generally follow the pattern “Reporter goes undercover at…..,” and Douban commenters have suggested that the paper ought to change its name to City Undercover News (城市卧底报).

Some previous cover feature headlines:

  • City Sun reporter goes undercover to the source in Dezhou to expose fake shampoo and body wash
  • Reporter goes undercover to deal in person with sellers of personal information
  • City Sun goes undercover at Dairy Queen, attracts national attention
  • Reporter works undercover at McDonald’s for a month
  • Reporter goes undercover at RT Mart to sell meat
  • Reporter goes undercover to Qingdao aid stations — finds the conditions acceptable, except for a smelly blanket
  • Reporter goes undercover at a working-class district dry-cleaning shop
  • Reporter goes undercover to expose the dark secrets of home renovation
  • Reporter goes undercover at Nike factory
  • Reporter goes undercover to expose the dark secrets of air conditioner repair
  • Reporter goes undercover as a real estate sales girl
  • Female reporter works undercover in a beauty salon for one month — this April 2010 series built up tension over three days and finally named names on the fourth
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A brief history of Chinese porn

The origins of Chinese erotica and pornography can be traced way back into antiquity. Though remnants have been found dating from as early as the 1st century, production of erotic artwork appears to have properly flourished around the 10th century and reached its peak during the late Ming Dynasty (17th century).

Ancient Chinese erotica drew its influences from both Daoist religious practices and the courtesan culture that was developing in the imperial courts. The spread and increases in production of erotic works coincided with the rise of the mercantile middle classes particularly in cities such as Suzhou, Hangzhou and Guangzhou. Pornographic artworks produced during the Ming dynasty were called ‘spring palace paintings’ (春宫画, chungong hua) a reference to the presumed debauchery that occurred behind the walls of the Forbidden City.

Much fiction, erotic and otherwise, during the Ming and Qing dynasties focused around the imagined practices of the imperial court. Whilst we can’t be sure how much truth there is to these works, its safe to say that the Emperors weren’t playing mahjong with their thousands of concubines. Chungong hua are similar in style to the Japanese shunga tradition of art of the same period. The paintings depict an incredible diversity of sexual practices, including threesomes; lesbianism; homosexuality; oral and anal sex, and orgies; enough to make the most hardened Communist Party censor blush. Some collections of artwork, termed ‘pillow books’ were given to newly married couples as instruction guides, but the main purpose of the artwork does appear to have been to titillate.

Towards the end of the Ming Dynasty, the erotic classic The Plum in the Golden Vase (金瓶梅, Jin Ping Mei) was published. Written under a pseudonym, the book is a naturalistic masterpiece composed in the vernacular language. It is sometimes considered to be the ‘fifth’ of the Four Great Classical Novels (Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Water Margin, Journey to the West, Dream of the Red Chamber). Jin Ping Mei was the first full-length Chinese work to depict explicit sex scenes and despite being acclaimed as “a landmark in the development of the narrative art form” it has often been suppressed as pornography in China. Within the Middle Kingdom has a scandalous notoriety akin to Lady Chatterley’s Lover in Britain.

The novel focuses on the downfall of a great household and its patriarch who, over the course of the story, has nineteen sexual partners encompassing a wide range of acts and a surprising number of sex toys. Jin Ping Mei predicated a proliferation of Ming-era Chinese erotica from lowbrow bawdy scripts designed to scandalize and titillate to works of great literature such as The Embroidered Couch (termed “the most licentious and inflaming book of its age” by contemporary translator Lenny Hu.

Much erotica produced during this period focused itself on the practice of foot binding. Bound and small feet were considered to be especially erotic, analogous to the obsession with big breasts in the West. Rich husbands would even put their wife’s shoes on display to show off to the world how minute their loved ones’ feet were. One especially notorious work that came from this boom-period of Chinese erotica was the Carnal Prayer Mat (肉蒲團, rouputuan) an erotic novel written by Qing dynasty author Li Yu. The Carnal Prayer Mat was illustrated in a style similar to the earlier chungong hua paintings and features an outrageous plot in which the main character seeks to seduce a woman away from her well-endowed husband and so undergoes surgery to replace his penis with that of a dog. Each chapter ends with a short critique of the action, ostensibly by a reviewer but presumably written by the author himself, enhancing the tongue in cheek humour of the novel.

Illustration from 'The Carnal Prayer Mat'
Illustration from ‘The Carnal Prayer Mat’

But The Carnal Prayer Mat was published at a time when the ruling elite’s attitudes to sex and pornography were beginning to change. Whilst authors and artists during the Ming Dynasty had prospered under relatively liberal policies promoting science and the arts, the Qing Dynasty ushered in a conservative attitudes to sex and eroticism inspired both by Christian missionaries from the West and a resurgent Confucian movement.

This eventually resulted in the banning and even destruction of many previously treasured works of art; indeed, the oldest and best-preserved copy of the Carnal Prayer Mat only survives by dint of having been taken to Japan (it currently resides in Tokyo University).

A previously thriving genre of painting and literature was all but stamped out in the 17th and 18th centuries. Following the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the first republic, and the country’s traumatic experience during the world wars, which finally resulted in the emergence of the People’s Republic of China, attitudes remained conservative. Today the ruling Communist Party hierarchy continues to take a hard line on issues relating to sex and erotica.

However, whilst government rhetoric stridently opposes them, both prostitutes and pornography remain easy to come by in modern China. Despite regular crackdowns and highly publicized raids on brothels, the sex industry thrives, with one 2005-study suggesting that Beijing alone has over 200,000 prostitutes. Pornography too has proven a thorn in the government’s side, particularly since the advent of the internet. Today China has the most internet users of any country in the world.

Despite the worlds most sophisticated monitoring and filtering software arrayed against them, tech savvy Chinese jump the Great Firewall with ease. For those less computer literate, pirated porn DVDs and VCDs are easy to buy if rarely on display. Porn is big business on the black market. In one 2008 bust in Shanghai authorities confiscated over 8,000 DVDs on their way from Guangdong. Internet crackdowns are frequent; the most recent was launched in 2009, with over 60,000 websites confiscated and shutdown by the authorities. Pornographic materials remain easy to acquire however, through p2p services, torrent sites and numerous websites that have escaped the censors. The futility of the authorities’ attempts to police this area was illustrated by the Edison Chen scandal that broke in early 2008.

A number of photos depicting Chen, a Canadian-Chinese film star, and several Hong Kong and Chinese actresses and musicians engaging in sexual activities and posing naked, were posted on a Hong Kong forum. The images spread almost instantaneously around the Hong Kong internet community and quickly found their way onto foreign and mainland Chinese websites.

For several weeks major sites such as Baidu turned a blind eye, and they were widely viewed all over China. When a belated crackdown began, officials declared that sharing the photos or posting them online could be punishable by up to 15 days detention. A number of people were arrested in Shenzhen on suspicion of producing CDs of the images, which had apparently been selling “like hotcakes”. Baidu, which had made it particularly easy to find the photos thanks to its image-search function, was instructed to make a public apology by the Beijing Internet Self-Discipline Organization. However, once the dust had settled over the scandal and the authorities attention turned elsewhere the photos remained, and are still viewable on the Chinese internet.

Whilst the Edison Chen incident had more in common with a traditional tabloid scandal than pure pornography, it demonstrates Beijing’s limits in suppressing materials when there is high demand. The spread of VCDs and DVDs during the Chen scandal may also give us a glimpse as to how illegal pirated pornography was spread before the advent of the internet. Unfortunately, statistics on the spread of pre-internet pornography are impossible to come by as the Chinese government does not publish them and researchers of pornography in China have too drawn a blank. It is safe to assume however that the practice was similar to the under-the-table sales of DVDs and videos still taking place today.

It remains difficult to gather statistics even on modern porn usage in China though some idea can be gleaned from apocryphal sources. During a call for tougher measures against the spread of erotic materials, education authorities stated that over 50% of under-18s had visited porn sites. Several porn stars have also become minor-celebrities in the China. The so called ‘Kappa Girl’ shot to fame after a video surfaced on micro-blogs of the Kappa employee having sex in a hotel room. Once a ‘human flesh search engine’ had named the girl, she took to her blog offering herself for hire as a model, rates starting at 20,000 RMB. She was later detained by Shanghai Police.

One porn star, who has managed to both find fame and stay out of trouble with the authorities, is Japanese AV Idol (porn star) Sora Aoi. Famous as the baby-faced, large breasted star of such films as Illegal Tits Violation 14 and Sexy Butt Climax 2004, Ms. Aoi is very popular in mainland China where she is currently attempting to branch out into mainstream stardom. Internet searches for her Chinese name return over 41 million hits, more even than Chinese NBA star Yao Ming. Ms. Aoi initially drew the ire of the authorities when the discovery of her Twitter handle by Chinese fans had netizens flocking to join the banned site, leap frogging the Great Firewall in the process, to leave Ms. Aoi messages in Mandarin and broken English and Japanese.

In late 2010 Ms. Aoi joined the Twitter-like Sina Weibo and quickly became the most popular micro-blogger in China, with over 2.8 million followers. She has proven so popular that at an appearance in Jiangxi province she was forced to flee the stage after just three minutes, such was the chaos caused by fans rushing towards the AV Idol.

Sora Aoi
Sora Aoi

Far from getting in trouble with the authorities, one police station in Dalian was discovered by netizens to have a Weibo account that solely followed Ms. Aoi’s updates. Officials from the station quickly claimed that the account had been hacked and that they would issue complaints with Weibo’s parent company Sina.com. (See also Adult video star Aoi Sola writes to China fans on blog and AV actress entices Chinese netizens to go on Twitter.)

Representatives for Ms. Aoi declined an invitation to comment on this story.

It remains unclear what the future holds for Chinese pornography users. Despite the tide of public opinion turning against the current approach: a recent Sina poll showed that only 2% of respondents supported the current prohibition; as well as a long history of Chinese erotic art and literature, the authorities haven’t shifted from their hardline stance against pornography. PRC officials have maintained an anti-pornography rhetoric since the country’s founding and, with internet regulation tighter than ever following the Arab Spring; China’s porn viewers are going to have to continue slipping by the censors for their gratification.

You can find more of James Griffiths’ writing at his blog; see also his piece on Danwei People’s Pornography – An interview with Katrien Jacobs.

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People’s Pornography – An interview with Katrien Jacobs

China has a long tradition of erotic art but pornographic films and pictures are currently illegal. Despite frequent anti-porn clampdowns, pornography remains available both online and in the form of DVDs.

A paper titled A Peep at Pornography Web in China compiled by scholars at Xi’an Jiatong University is one of the few authoritative sources of pornography statistics. The scholars examined “part of network traffic in Northwest Net of China, from Mar. 29 2009 to Jan. 25 2010” and “collected 92,950 online porn web pages from 1,826 porn sites” of which only 12.8% were hosted on servers inside China. The paper looks at usage patterns of the people detected visiting porn sites, but does not attempt to derive any numbers about porn use nationwide.

Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence suggests demand for porn in China is growing. Aside from professionally produced films, there is a growing subculture of DIY porn movies, which is one of the subjects Dr. Katrien Jacobs examines in her new book, People’s Pornography: Sex and Surveillance on the Chinese Internet.

James Griffiths recently interviewed Dr. Jacobs about her new book:

James Griffiths: Could you describe what ‘People’s Pornography’ is about and what it has to say regarding modern Chinese sexual culture? 

Katrien Jacobs: The book is about waves of Chinese erotica and pornography in the age of Internet activism and a tightening of Internet censorship. It shows that despite the total ban on pornography, Chinese people have developed an impressive porn industry and progressive sex cultures. I show that Chinese people can have access to sexually explicit products and are able to explore novel sexual identities. But there is currently also a new clampdown on political activists and sex/AIDs/queer activists, so the book wavers between optimism and despair about China’s future.

 

JG: In your opinion, has the government’s campaign against online pornography been at all effective in the long run? Or are the censors fighting a losing battle?

KC: There are several statistics that show the net-porn industries are surviving and flourishing despite the ban. It seems indeed that porn cannot be banned and that the PRC government is perhaps even secretly letting it into the country. But besides their bombastic cleanup campaigns, they also censor web communities that stand for sexual freedom or queer identity. It seems as if sexual minorities, sex artists and activists are much more vulnerable than those involved in mainstream commercial porn, especially at this moment when film festivals are being shut down and human rights activist are being tortured and detained. These are the dark times of China’s civil right and sexual creative outlet, but there is still so much porn and sex entertainment available that we can see it as safer outlet.

 

JG: There seems to be a preference amongst Chinese porn consumers for Japanese produced materials, for example the number of Japanese AV stars who cultivate a near mainstream popularity in China. Do you think there is a general preference for Japanese porn and if so, what are the factors behind it?

KC: Yes it seems that Chinese men really prefer Japanese porn over Western porn. I think it is primarily because the Japanese know how the play the Chinese markets for pop culture and sex entertainment. They simply supply an excessive kind of erotic imagination that Chinese entrepreneurs cannot handle. Even though there is a wealth of genres and mind-boggling fetish products available from Japan, the cultures actually share a quite narrow-minded patriarchal view on sexual pleasure. This is perhaps the reason why Chinese men like Japanese stars, because they embody a feminine ideal of innocence and purity that is harder to find in Western porn. Western females in porn are considered to be too active and too “coarse” for Chinese men. Also, it works well for Chinese people, and specifically youngsters, to project liberation and otherness onto the “foreign” Japanese porn culture.

 

JG: In the West, one of the primary criticisms against pornography is the possibly detrimental effect it may have on young people’s interpretations of sex and gender politics. With China’s woeful record on sexual education is there a danger that many young Chinese are only or primarily getting information on sex from pornography?

KC: Yes that is definitely happening now. I have interviewed many students who have said that pornography is their only sex education. I think that it is a problem indeed, as it creates distorted expectations in males who do not know very well how to handle their women sexually. Generally speaking the porn culture and erotic vanguards in China are leaving behind the women and sexual minorities.

Pan Suiming is one of the leading Chinese scholars who has documented the deep-rooted effects of abstinence and sex/porn starvation in males during the Mao years. While males are now able to find a wealth of movies and hostess/sex work services, it is much harder for women to participate and release their frustration about this situation. So I think that China needs porn education, which would be more exciting than sex education, and would allow all kinds of people to watch and judge products, or even to make some of their own. But this is merely a fantasy at the current moment.

 

JG: It has been argued by some commentators that the Chinese government uses its much publicized drives against pornography as an excuse to increase general internet filtering and surveillance. Would you agree with these accusations?

KC: Yes it does seem to work that way, just as they can use a cheap kind of anti-art or anti-dissident or anti-vulgarity rhetoric to carry out surveillance and to randomly arrest people. That is also why they went after the “big guy” Ai Wei Wei who stands for all of these subversive potentials at once, including sexual freedom and “erotic laughter,” the right to make vulgar kinds of art and jokes. But we also have to keep in mind that the official government bulletins are not taken seriously by Chinese people. I read quite a few of them while researching my book and when asking my informants if the believed in government statistics intimidations, they would often smile and say: “No. Of course not!”

 

JG: Other than within the Special Administrative Regions, particularly Hong Kong, is there such a thing as Chinese pornography?

KC: There is very little Chinese pornography, but China is so ready for it. Meanwhile, there are some DIY productions on the Internet, or there are webcam movies being made by sex workers for their clients. There are online web communities for erotic literature and taboo stories, and there are diaries and galleries by bloggers. I am not sure where it is going. Hong Kong has equally lost its glory days of erotic soft-core cinema, but at least there are small squads of people who are into them, and I do think these older movies are marvelous. There is the recent Hong Kong 3D porn blockbuster “3D Sex and Zen: Extreme Ecstasy,” which was an enormous success in the box office and really also create a moment of social awareness and “sex talk” both in China and Hong Kong.

Katrien Jacobs is an academic, author and activist. She has a blog, and was recently interviewed by CNNgo. People’s Pornography will soon be available for sale on Amazon.

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Qaddafi’s imminent fall – some views from China

The Final Battle - front page of Peninsular Metropolitan News

The news coming out of Libya this morning has been reported without much commentary by Xinhua News Agency and most newspapers and websites in China. That has not stopped editors from using the news to sell papers; see for example the front page of the Qingdao newspaper Peninsular Metropolitan Newsillustrated with a large photo of armed rebels running past a burning car, and the bullet-riddled headline “FINAL BATTLE – Libyan rebels enter the capital” (online version here).

Press coverage of the Libyan civil war in China has been rather unenthusiastic about regime change since the protests that began on February 15 this year and spiraled into an armed conflict, and it’s likely that this tone will continue.

The Global Times, a tabloid that often takes an anti-Western stance has not yet published an editorial on the conflict but probably will do soon, judging from editor-in-chief Hu Xijin’s comments on his Weibo microblog. Here is one of them in translation (original here):

In today’s world of negotiation and compromise, Libya has a revolution even more bloody than those of the last century to change the country: this is unreasonable with respect to history.

In this “final battle” for Tripoli, Gaddafi has already been forced into the position of either dying while fighting, or ending up being hanged.

When Western countries can help Libya to make choices, they always help them to make the choice with the highest cost.

The Global Times‘ website has been running a poll, asking the question “Can Qaddafi’s fall bring stability to Libya?”.

At the time of writing, 351 people or 12% of those polled think that Qaddafi’s fall may lead to stability, while 2,640 people or 88% disagree. This fits in with The Global Times‘ usual readership and editorial thinking that sees stability as key.

The comments to the poll however display a variety of attitudes, although some commenters appear to have misunderstood how to vote. Here some of the comments in translation: translated

Agree that Qaddafi’s fall can lead to stability

However it happens, the destruction of Qaddafi’s dictatorship is the greatest victory.

If Qaddafi doesn’t fall from power, things can only get worse. It will get better after he falls, but it might take a long time.

Qaddafi falling from power can bring stability to Libya.

This is how history makes progress.

It’s just like Afghanistan

It’s just like Iraq

The Libyan opposition is just a mob, they have no ability to administer a country, so they will not bring stability to Libya.

All despots have the common understanding that only despotism can maintain stability.

Disagree that Qaddafi’s fall can lead to stability

It might be the start of even more chaos.

For reference, see Iraq.

The opposition’s occupation just means the start of a long period of civil strife!

Afghanistan and Iraq are concrete examples.

It’s like Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia: it will never be stable.

Because the so-called opposition are just running dogs of the Americans, whatever the boss tells them to do, they’ll do. In the end the people will overthrow them, they’ll use guns like in Iraq and expel the invaders.

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We survived a day in China

Notes about social criticism and black humor on the Chinese Internet, by Victor H. Mair, Professor of Chinese Language and Literature at the University of Pennsylvania. 

We survived!

Here is a translation of the cartoon at left that has been circulating widely on the Chinese Internet.

Man: I’m so glad you weren’t poisoned (to death) by gutter oil, Sudan red, lean meat essence, or toxic buns!

Your house didn’t catch on fire!

The bridge in front of your house didn’t collapse, right?

You’re so lucky that the escalator didn’t malfunction when you went to work!

It’s wonderful! We survived another day!

Woman: I was so worried you’d get run over by someone supposedly going 70 kph on your way to work!

Or get stabbed eight times in a row!

My gravest fear was that you would be accidentally injured by chengguan who were beating up someone else!

I was also worried you would need to ride the high speed train!

But I didn’t dare to call you, because I was afraid your cell phone would explode!

*****

Virtually every line alludes to some sensational event of the past few years that has gone viral on the Chinese internet, such that there has developed a whole vocabulary of memes devoted to things that have led to the death of innocent citizens. The ones in the cartoon constitute but a small subset of the available corpus.

Notes:
• Gutter oil: oil reclaimed from filthy swill that has been “cleansed” with various chemicals
• Sudan red: a carcinogenic dye
• Lean meat essence ( clenbuterol): chemical mixture that makes fat meat seem lean
• Toxic buns are steamed buns (mantou laced with unwholesome ingredients to make them look nicer
• Fires at apartment complexes and factories are too numerous to list, but one fire that went viral on the Internet happened in Shanghai in November 2010, killing 79 people; see initial reports and aftermath.
• Bridge collapse probably refers to various bridge accidents that happened in July 2011.
• Escalator malfunction refers to an accident on an escalator that happened at the Beijing Zoo subway station on July 2011, resulting in numerous injuries, some serious, and at least one death.
• 70 kph refers to a hit and run case that preceded the famous my Dad is Li Gang case, in which police in Hangzhou appear to have colluded with a driver’s version of events after a hit-and-run accident.
• Stabbed 8 times refers to another car accident in October 2010 after which the driver, Yao Jiqin, stabbed the victim to death when he realized that she was still alive after he drove into her.
• Chengguan are the thuggish city management officials who are supposed to keep order on the streets but who often end up abusing citizens.
• High speed train refers to the deadly collision between two trains that took place near Wenzhou on July 23, 2011.
• Exploding cell phones are not uncommon in China.

Every generation destroyed by something

This piece of doggerel has been widely circulated on the Chinese Internet recently and complements the mood of the cartoon:

Milk powder destroyed those born in the 2000s.
Examinations destroyed those born in the 90s.
Real estate prices destroyed those born in the 80s.
Unemployment destroyed those born in the 70s.
The chengguan destroyed those born in the 60s.
Stepping down from one’s post destroyed those born in the 50s.
Forced demolition and removal destroyed those born in the 40s.
“Reform” of the medical system destroyed those born in the 30s.
2012 will destroy everybody else.

Original:

奶粉灭掉00后,考试灭掉90后,房价灭掉80后,失业灭掉70后,城管灭掉60后,下岗灭掉50后,拆迁灭掉40后,医改灭掉30后,2012年灭掉所有后.

*********************

Professor Victor H. Mair is a regular blogger at Language Log and the founder-editor of Sino-Platonic Papers.

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The dizi

The dizi (笛子) is one of China’s oldest instruments. Similar- though not identical to- the Western flute, the dizi probably originated around 8,000 years ago and remains ubiquitous in contemporary China. Early dizi were made from bone but bamboo became the most material.

In this video, Zhang Zhongzhong demonstrates this bamboo-crafted instrument, playing the “New Shepherd’s Song”, a Mongolian folk tune. If you can’t see the video below, you can also watch it on Youtube and Tudou.

More about the dizi
Wikipedia: Dizi
Chinese Flute.com: home page
Old Flutes: Chinese flutes

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The pipa: How a barbarian lute became a national symbol

"Playing the pipa behind the back" - A pipa player from the Mogao Caves at Dunhuang

‘Playing the pipa behind the back’ is a special kind of Chinese gongfu that expresses flying in heaven at Dunhuang. [See image of pipa player from Mogao caves at Dunhuang]

The road to industrialization with Chinese characteristics was taken by Mao Zedong after imitating the Soviets for 8 years, when he threw away the crutch and stood independently.  The most unique aspect of that was the reverse method of strengthening agriculture in order to speed up heavy industry:  this an example of ‘playing the pipa behind the back’ studied from life.

The road to informationalization with Chinese characteristics is taken when people today, after following the Americans for eight years, throw away the crutch and stand on our own two feet.  The most unique aspect is using the reverse method of strengthening manufacturing in order to accelerate the information industry.  This, too, is behind-the-back pipa-playing studied from life.
Jiang Jipin, “Informationalizing Manufacturing is Key of Keys–’Playing Pipa Behind the Back’:  Seeking the Informationalization with Chinese Characteristics Road to Macroeconomic Policy.”  (2002)

The short-necked, pear-shaped East Asian lute known as the pipa (琵琶) is one of the most, if not the most popular, Chinese musical instrument in China today. Its bright timbre, rapid rolling tremolo and the special vibrato and semi-tones — produced by bending its strings — instantly evokes “China” in soundtracks. It is the Chinese instrument most favored by Western and Chinese composers attempting to fuse aspects of Western and Chinese classical music in their orchestral, chamber and musical theatre works. And it is the Chinese instrument that many feel has been most successfully “reformed” to meet the needs of the modern Chinese nation.

In the expression “to play pipa behind the back” (反弹琵琶), moreover, the pipa is brandished in business, economic, and political contexts as quoted in the example above. Its sense is similar to “thinking outside the box,” but with a nationalistic tinge: a sort of “thinking outside the box with Chinese characteristics.”

Thus, while the pipa is not as obvious a national symbol as, say, the sitar in India or the bagpipes in Scotland, it comes close. This is ironic, however, because while many of the instruments in the Chinese traditional ensemble are originally imports, it is for the pipa that those associations with foreign lands are most salient. For one thing, the name pipa itself sounds foreign in Chinese.

There is debate over whether the word itself actually is a Chinese transliteration of a foreign word or a Chinese onomatopoeia, but the earliest references in Chinese texts, dating to the 1st or 2nd century CE, affirm that the instruments called “pipa” were themselves of foreign origin, having been brought by northern or western “barbarians.” Later references from the Jin dynasty (265-419 CE) refer to an instrument from even earlier. The qin pipa, a spike-lute constructed by attaching a neck and strings to a drum) was supposedly invented by workers on the Qin era (221-206 BCE) Great Wall—that is likewise associated with wild frontier parts and is quite likely to have been inspired by if not copied from instruments used by the Xiongnu people.

The pipa’s foreign roots are a fundamental and obvious part of its lore. Various instruments given the name pipa were introduced to China over several centuries. The imports most resembling the modern pipa came following the fall of the Han (206 BCE – 220 CE). Murals on cave temples and tombs from Dunhuang and elsewhere in western China and Xinjiang depict musicians playing various varieties of pear-shaped lutes; the most famous images are those of apsaras and devas in attendance on Buddhas and Bodhisattvas; they are often depicted while aloft, sleeves and dupatta’s aflutter, and sometimes play the pipa behind their back (hence the phrase quoted above).

This brand of in-flight entertainment is linked inescapably to the Western Regions, the Silk Road, the introduction of Buddhism from India and Central Asia, and more generally with the exoticism and eclecticism of the Tang period, when the fad for music from the Western Regions (especially Kucha, in the Tarim Basin) reached a height. Most Tang poets rhapsodized at one point or another about the pipa, its music and musicians; as one modern scholar puts it, “there were pipas in the poems and poems in the pipas,” referring to service of Tang poems as lyrics for airs played on solo pipa or ensembles in which pipas figured prominently.

The famous pipa melodies themselves were often foreign imports (such as Nishang, mentioned in Bai Juyi‘s “Pipa Song“) or thought to be such, and the poems were populated with courtesans and dancing boys, exotic beauties serving up warmed wine and flattery to their scholar clients.

Thus the strongest candidate for Chinese national instrument and cultural icon in fact has a foreign pedigree that is not only acknowledged but celebrated. This stands in contrast to the guqin 古琴 or qin 琴, which would be the pipa’s closest competitor in a contest for status of “Chinese national instrument.” This short, seven-string zither dates back to the early first millennium BC and has always been closely associated with elements of early Chinese cosmology as well as Confucian values and Daoist quietism. Though a cherished object of the literati studio and the instrument whose name serves as the categorical Chinese term for all stringed instruments (including harps, viols, the hammered dulcimer 扬琴 and piano 钢琴), the qin, arguably, is today heard less than the pipa in China, and remains far less recognizable abroad.

One could argue that this has less to do with the kind of symbolic associations I have been discussing above and more to do with a sort of Darwinian selection among musical instruments: the qin is a solo instrument with low volume and soft tone given neither to ensemble performance or fast playing; it is thus technically less adaptable than the pipa to many kinds of music. But this, too, is important, for players, listeners and patrons of music have criteria about what they chose to play, listen to and support. The pipa’s position today as Chinese instrument and musical ambassador outside China is the product of such decisions, decisions which were made on the basis of both technical criteria and less tangible considerations. Moreover, these decisions were taken in a time of urgent political exigencies and acute cultural insecurity, in the context of China’s challenging engagement with the world in the 20th century.

Early pipas in China and the emergence of Chinese pipa

The first records of lutes in China date only from the 3rd century BC (as compared with the second millennium BC in Egypt and Mesopotamia). The word “pipa” was first used in China for a variety of plucked chordophones introduced from that time until around the beginning of the Tang (AD 617). These included the qin pipa and the ruanxian (阮咸) likewise a round-bodied instrument). The pear-shaped pipa (a bowl lute, in the Sachs-Hornbostel categorization) seems to have come to China in the Han period, and was known as Han pipa to distinguish it from the earlier instrument. The first textual references to these pear-shaped lutes in China date from the second century AD, and suggest that at that time it was a recent arrival. While archaeological and other evidence suggests introduction from Central Asia (Gandhara) and / or India (“pipa” may be related to the word “veena”), the literary tradition in China associates the Han pipa with the northern frontier and the famous princesses Xijun and Zhaojun who were married to nomad rulers of the Wusun and Xiongnu peoples, in what is now Mongolia and northern Xinjiang respectively.

Curiously, in the earliest textual reference to the legend linking the pipa to the Wusun, a fifth-century lyric poem by Fu Xuan, the emperor is said to have commissioned the construction of a stringed instrument modeled on but different from the Chinese zither and harp, especially to entertain the princess on horseback. This instrument was given a foreign name (pipa), according to Fu Xuan, because it was transported to (not from) a foreign country. The scholar Laurence Picken concludes that this illogical explanation, like the story from the same source that the spike lute was invented by workers on the Great Wall, is meant to save face by asserting Chinese origin for what was clearly a foreign import.

To Picken’s surmise, we might add the following: If pipa music was meant to alleviate the princesses’ homesickness, was the pipa to achieve this by reminding them of home, or by distracting them from their memories? Much of the point of the Xijun and Zhaojun stories, songs and poems is their exoticism: drinking kumis (fermented mare’s milk) and living in tents, for example, were outlandish activities from the Chinese point of view. Thus, I suspect the presence of pipas in the picture is also part of the frontier tableau; pipas were not to be read as a domestic image, as a bit of civilization in the wilderness like, say, spinet pianos in little houses on the American prairie. They belonged, rather, on horseback.

From the third century through the Sui and Tang era, the pear-shaped pipa was increasingly popular in China. It at first held close associations to Buddhism, appearing in mural and sculptural representations of musicians in Buddhist contexts. In the Tang, it was, as mentioned above, a principal instrument in court music, where its most famous players were from Kucha (a cosmopolitain oasis and Buddhist center in what is now Xinjiang). It served as an icon used by Tang poets to evoke romance, pathos and the far west. By the late Tang, solo and chamber music for pipa and ensembles including pipa had moved out of the court and enjoyed the patronage of merchants.

Increasingly, pipa players abandoned the use of a large plectrum and adapted a repertoire of right-hand techniques stemming from the Chinese qin tradition. (Ultimately, the large plectrum — which resembles a spatula used to serve rice — was abandoned in most parts of China, but it continues in Japan both in biwa and shamisen playing.)

By the tenth century AD, the pipa was thoroughly indigenized. Most of the Sui and Tang era music for pipa has been lost, but a set of 25 pieces for pipa (or pipa parts from music written for ensemble) were preserved among the manuscripts walled away at Dunhuang. They were rediscovered in 1907 and various attempts at deciphering their tablature and reconstructing the music have been made.

There is a long gap in preserved music for pipa between the 10th and mid-sixteenth century. But in the interval, the pipa was adopted in several regional musical styles and as accompaniment for singing. There are a few Ming and Qing era collections of pipa music that indicate further development of regional styles.

Fretting about the state of Chinese music

The pipa turned out by Chinese lutiers and factories today and played by amateurs and professionals alike, is quite a different instrument not only from that of the Tang, but from that of the nineteenth century. Most noticeable of these changes is the greater volume and brighter tone arising from the recent adoption of metal strings and use of plastic picks attached to the fingers, which permit the instrument to hold its own in orchestral settings. The most profound transformation is the diatonic, equally tempered scale of the new instruments.

In the 20th century, Chinese intellectuals grew concerned over the state of Chinese music. This was just one of many cultural anxieties arising from China’s military weakness and political disarray in the aftermath of the rebellions, wars and losses of sovereignty since the first half of the nineteenth century. Just as “traditional” family structures, manufacturing systems, government, literary style, and school curricula became the focus of intense debate and proposals for reform, so too did music.

The sense that Chinese music and instruments needed such reforming was intensified by comparisons with the West and Japan and the gathering sense that only modernization informed by science could preserve the nation from destruction. By the May Fourth era (c. 1919), no less prominent an educator and modernizer than Cai Yuanpei, first chancellor of Peking University (and later co-founder of what would become the Shanghai Conservatory of Music) believed that Chinese music needed rescuing as part of the national salvation project:

As an essential element of art, music is intimately related to cultural advancement. Advanced countries all tried their best to advocate the equalization of science and arts in order to renovate cultures. We are now advocating science. But for music, we haven’t done anything… Not only science needs formal education, the arts need it also. China has no musical conservatories; there are no musical departments even in our university [Peking University]. I hope everyone knows that music is a useful weapon for cultural advancement. We should improve Chinese traditional music by learning from the efforts of Western music. And we should persist in promoting Chinese music in order to keep pace with the world.

Thus this rescue was to be effected, Cai believed in 1919, by studying the west and striving to keep up with it musically.

During the Republican period (1912-1949), especially before 1937 and the onset of full-scale war with Japan, efforts were applied to the pipa by a few famous virtuosi (Liu Tianhua, Abin [Hua Yanjun], Wei Zhonglou), and aided by the opening of conservatories and university music departments in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and elsewhere.

Specifically, Liu Tianhua 刘天华 is credited with increasing the number of frets on the instrument by adding two on the neck and five on the body, to create an instrument with 19 frets (as opposed to the 10 to 14 found on nineteenth and early twentieth-century pipas). Though some early pipas had frets only on the neck, there are also early precedents for adding higher frets — and hence range — above the neck on the pipa’s soundboard itself: one example is from as early as the fifth century, another from the early eighth, and from the 15th and 16th century there are Chinese as well as Korean and Vietnamese pipas with extended fretboards. But Liu’s modification was not simply to add range to the instrument, but to give it a diachronic scale and equal temperament. His pipa was more suited to playing western music or playing alongside equally-tempered western instruments, and he began introducing “western compositional and technical concepts” to the traditional pipa repertoire.

Nevertheless, there was relatively little official or public interest in traditional Chinese instruments in the Republican period. In 1937 at China’s foremost center of musical training and research, the Shanghai Conservatory of Music, only two out of 110 advanced students specialized in Chinese as opposed to European instruments. It was not until the 1950s that innovations in pipa design along the lines of Liu Tianhua’s experiments were continued and became wide-spread. The ways in which these changes were disseminated and institutionalized are telling, as is the rationale for them and the rhetoric in which discussion of pipa “reform” is cast.

Kuang Yuzhong 邝宇忠, a professor and instructor of pipa in the National Music (minzu yinyue) Department of the Central Music Conservatory (中央音乐学院), has left a memoir of his efforts to “reform” the pipa. Kuang may not have been alone in working to re-engineer the instrument and techniques for playing it, but his detailed narrative of the process is the only such account I have found.

When Kuang first entered the Central Music Conservatory as a student in 1953, he played an old-style pipa. There was no separate department for Chinese music at that time, so he studied with classmates specializing in western instruments. He envied their ability to practice scales, arpeggios and studies in all twelve keys; he himself did the same on his second instrument, the bassoon, but his old-style pipa could play seven-note scales in only a few keys — it lacked the semi-tones necessary to play full scales in the other keys.

Kuang knew about Liu Tianhua’s experiments and had obtained a chart of how frets on stringed instruments should be positioned for equal temperament. He commissioned the Tianjin Musical Instrument Factory to make him an equally tempered pipa with 24 frets. Armed with this new instrument, Kuang practiced his drills in all 12 keys, and began transcribing western and non-Han Chinese violin music for the pipa: his first choices included Rimski-Korsakov’s “Flight of the Bumblebee,” Mozart’s “Turkish March,” “Xinchun Yue” (Song of Spring) and “Xinjiang Chun” (Xinjiang Spring).

Since pipa had come to China from Central Asia in the first place, and its most famous Tang era composers and players were from the Xinjiang city of Kucha, it is thus quite ironic that an overhaul of the instrument was necessary to allow it to play a non-pentatonic song like “Xinjiang Spring.” And of course, while not surprising, it is worth highlighting that like Liu Tianhua before him, Kuang’s goal in commissioning this redesigned instrument was to accommodate it to the harmonic and melodic structures of European music.

The next innovation was to play the pipa with false nails. As any classical guitarist knows, the strength, smoothness and shape of fingernails are an endless, almost fetishistic source of concern to musicians for whom a broken nail means weeks of unsatisfying practice, or none at all. Most stringed instrument traditions that adopt metal strings while still playing with fingers and not a separate plectrum have come up with some sort of solution to the friability of nails; this usually takes the form of artificial picks fastened to the end of the finger. The curved plastic or steel thumb and finger picks used by banjo-players and steel-string guitarists are one example; the wound-wire slip-on mizrab used in India is another; the slim loop (nakhäla) that slips under the nail and is tied on with thread by players of the Uyghur tämbür is another.

Already in the early 1950s, some pipa players in China were polishing their nails to strengthen them. This was necessary, according to Kuang, because of the professionalization of the instrument: more practice and performance time meant more wear and tear on the nails. In 1956, Liang Shikan came up with a method of notching pieces of celluloid and fastening them to his right hand fingers and thumb with cloth tape. He visited the Central Conservatory of Music to demonstrate the technique. When Kuang and his classmates tried it, the results were noisy and awkward, but with a little experimentation they eliminated the notches, carefully shaped the nail edge and angled both nail and hand-position so as to minimize clicks and rattles. This was fine for preserving the nails while practicing, but initially no one performed publically on the pipa with bits of plastic taped to the ends of their fingers.

In 1958, Kuang graduated and was assigned to teach pipa at the high school attached to the Central Music Conservatory. There his pipa students were also required to study piano, but could not do so properly with long fingernails. Kuang thus decided to dispense with long nails altogether and use taped-on false nails for performance as well as practice. He found that the picks stayed on even more securely with only short nails underneath, and encouraged his students to try it. In this fashion, a centuries-old playing technique was abandoned, or at least drastically modified, so that pipa-ists could practice the piano. But another reason may have been the greater attack and volume false nails provided.

What Kuang calls the “third great reform” of the pipa was the adoption of metal strings. Traditional pipa strings were of silk, sometimes of gut. In the first half of the twentieth century there had been some experiments with stringing pipas with steel strings, none of which, in Kuang’s estimation, had been particularly successful. In 1959 the Central Music Conservatory moved from Tianjin to Beijing, a city which was itself then undergoing great changes. As Kuang had cut away his fingernails, Beijing’s planners had cleared the dense precincts around what had been the Qing dynasty palace, or Forbidden City, expanding the square and planning to flank it with grand, modern structures. In this form the new Tian’anmen Square would become the political epicenter of the People’s Republic of China.

The year of the Conservatory’s relocation to Beijing corresponded with the forced-march construction of the Great Hall of the People on the newly expanded square, an enormous trophy project of the Great Leap Forward campaign, then just ramping up. There was much buzz about how Li Ruihuan, chief architect of the project (and later member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Politburo), found Mao Zedong’s theoretical writings an inspiration to resolving engineering problems. In this heady environment, Kuang experienced an epiphany: he undertook to apply the wisdom of Mao’s famous essays “On Practice” and “On Contradictions” to the pipa:

“I thought, the main contradiction of the recent past, the problem of false nails, had already been resolved. Well, what was the next main contradiction?”

After Kuang analyzed the problem with the help of the Chairman’s dialectical materialism, he recalls, the answer was obvious: strings.

Kuang’s memoir next proceeds straight to the technical aspects of his efforts to find appropriate metal strings for his pipa, without elaborating on what exactly was contradictory about using silk strings on a traditional Chinese instrument in the first place. The poets, after all, refered to the pipa and other stringed instruments metonymously as “the silk,” and the small ensembles playing the southern Chinese style of music are known as “silk and bamboo ensembles” (sizhu tuan 丝竹团). But Zhou Dafang, another Chinese writer on musical modernization, makes the reasoning explicit: “[On the old instrument,] strings were made of silk material, their tone weak and soft. This clearly did not meet the needs of a modern solo or ensemble instrument.”

Against the background of calls for musical “modernization” in China since the May 4th era, and especially after the coming to power of the Communist Party, the remaining “contradiction” Kuang identified lay between the capabilities of the silk-stringed instrument and the demands placed upon the arts in the New China. Musical reformers and their political allies and patrons in the Republican period increasingly saw large orchestral arrangement as the touchstone of modern, advanced music, and as the best means to deploy music as an instrument of propaganda and even social control.

Despite the rift between communist and nationalist parties that split musicians along with the rest of the country into two camps, the bias towards the large and the grand continued into the Communist era. In his famous talks on culture at Yan’an, Mao enjoined writers and artists to draw inspiration from the masses, but even when drawn originally from folk environments, art and music was to be refigured and broadcast back to the masses in a form that was appropriately grand and emphasized the positive. Neither the guqin, designed for the scholar’s studio, nor even a small ensemble of soft-toned instruments could, by their very nature, speak to the masses. This was not an era for subtle aesthetics. To serve new China — and it had no choice but to serve — Chinese music needed to be louder and brighter.

Kuang realized that now that the problem of fingernail wear had been solved, he could use higher-tension metal strings, if only the right composition and construction could be found. Kuang started with piano strings, but they were too high-tension and made the pipa’s action too hard. So he went for help — where else? — to the “Beijing City Sausage Casing Factory” (that would later become the “Beijing City Violin Factory’s String-making Workshop”). With assistance from this suitably proletarian quarter and after some experimentation, Kuang hit upon silver-wound steel as the best sounding solution; unfortunately, this cost too much to manufacture. He then discovered that strings wound with “a material called “dehe gold” (德合金) worked nearly as well, and was cheaper. And thus the factory began marketing “Red Flag Brand Dehe Metal Pipa Strings.” (The components of pipa strings today include high tension nylon as well as steel cores and windings.)

Kuang had hoped to experiment with the strings for some time himself before allowing his students to make the switch: he was afraid they would injure their developing hands by practicing on the harder strings. But there was no restraining the keen boy students who rushed to make their instruments louder and brighter sounding. Soon the guzheng 古筝 players made their own switch. Finally the girl pipa students switched over to metal strings as well.

* * *

Thus, in the twentieth-century, but especially during the 1950s, the pipa underwent a radical re-engineering. The resulting instrument lost its traditional intonation and the fretting system that had made it easy to play “right” notes within the pentatonic scale, but retained its particular timbre. It now enjoys standardized, equal temperament and a higher range. It can be played much louder thanks to tape-on nails and high-tension metal strings. These “reforms” suited the perceived needs of the reformers to make the pipa “modern,” which to them meant employing scientific principles in redesigning the instrument (the mathematics of equal temperament, an experimental method in working out new techniques and materials for fingerpicks and strings) and, in particular, playing music with European harmonic structures and arranged for large ensembles.

These reforms also helped make the pipa socialist, as Kuang’s linkage of steel strings to Maoist theory shows.

Finally, though the role of pioneers like Liu Tianhua and Kuang Yuzhong looms quite large, the main venue and vehicle for acceptance of the new pipa was institutional and state-run: the Central Music Conservatory in the capital, along with other conservatories and university music departments elsewhere in China.

The pipa is now the favorite example Chinese commentators on the subject use of a successful reform of a national (minzu 民族) instrument, because it has achieved equal temperament, harmonic flexibility and volume without sacrificing its unique Chinese characteristics.

Indeed, in a recent article entitled “The Reform of National Instruments” written for the journal Musical Instrument Research, Zhou Dafeng singles out the pipa as poster child to be emulated by such other instruments as the huqin 胡琴 family of spike fiddles, the seven string guqin, the guzheng and the sheng. Though these instruments’ reforms are still to be fully realized, Zhou is sanguine about future prospects for “reform,” provided that certain principles are followed. First of all, national and local government must play a role both in preserving old instruments and traditions, and also in selecting which instruments comprise the most promising candidates for reform, stressing strengths and minimizing weaknesses. He insists, also, upon a scientific approach to redesigning instruments — traditional affection for expensive and endangered materials such as mahogany or python skin must give way to pressurized wood and other modern materials as determined by scientific experimentation. And although Zhou doesn’t quite put it this way, reform and progress means westernization and globalization:

We must be compatible with the world’s advanced orchestras, to be sure, but we must also maintain the characteristic tone color of Chinese national instruments; moreover we must be able to perform Chinese and foreign, old and new pieces; moreover we must be able to perform together with western symphony orchestras, or establish large Chinese national string and wind ensembles. Therefore, we must not think of the reform of national instruments in the old way as some stand-alone single project, but must look to the whole world, look to the future, have a foothold in our nationality (minzu), and respect science. [emphasis added]

If the reforms are properly carried out, Zhou predicts, the various types of Chinese instruments will be able to form their own sections, together make up a Chinese symphony, and even beyond this, they may even join the most “advanced” western orchestras to jointly perform Chinese and western music. The western symphony orchestra, Zhou points out, lacks a plucked string instruments section. But it is with these instruments that China is most amply supplied, and the various playing techniques (especially tremolo) most advanced. In this way, then, Chinese will complement western instruments in a novel kind of orchestra.

With this notion, we are again playing the pipa behind our back, along with the economists and informationalizers of China’s cadre of national technocrats. It seems no coincidence in the age of “harmonious society” and “China’s peaceful rise” — slogans promoted by the current PRC leadership — that the highest aspiration for Chinese music is imagined to be its inclusion as an equal partner in the symphony of the world — and even that Chinese strengths could make up for western shortcomings.

Zhou’s outlook has not sloughed off the May 4th era’s sense of inferiority relative to the standardized construction, equal temperament and harmonic range of western instruments, and he remains convinced that large orchestras organized along western lines remain the touchstone of musical quality and modernity. Yet he demonstrates a new degree of confidence that China’s flagship instruments will ultimately take their place on the world stage. Of course, this can only be achieved through a careful collaborative effort, coordinated by the proper authorities, including local and national government. “By no means should individuals make decisions on their own!” (千万不能各自为政!)

The pipa, then, is the most Chinese of instruments to no small degree because it is the most foreign. Its several importations from Central Asia, Mongolia, and India, though they have at times in the centuries since the fall of the Tang been a source of embarrassment, are now again a strong point, demonstrating China’s proprietaryclaims over the Silk Road, its historical cosmopolitanism, and its success in indigenizing a once-foreign import. What is likewise remarkable about the pipa’s assumption of this status, however, is its intimate relationship to evolving Chinese nationalism, and the state’s close and largely unquestioned role in managing the pipa’s physical and symbolic re-engineering.

This essay is a version of a conference paper delivered at an AAS annual meeting on March 23, 2007 in Boston, Massachusetts.

Author James A. Millward 米华健 is Professor of History at Georgetown University. He specializes on China and Central Asia, is the author of Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang, and is currently working on The World on a String, which will be a history of stringed instruments on the silk road and the globalization of the guitar. He writes on history and stringed instruments on his blog, The World on a String.

Selected References:

• Chen Huiqing. “Pipa yishu fazhan wanshan de lishi guiji” (the historical trajectory of the perfection of the pipa’s artistic development). Yinyue yanjiu (Ethnic arts): 1996: 4: 128-133.

• Jiang Jipin. “Zhizaoye xinxihua shi guanjian de guanjian—fantan pipa: Zhongguo tese xinxihua daolu de hongguan jingji zhengce quxiang” (Informationalizing Manufacturing is Key of Keys—’Playing pipa Behind the Back’: Seeking the Informationalization with Chinese Characteristics Road to Macroeconomic Policy.)Hulian gang zhoukan 18 November 2002, p. 22.

• Kishibe, Shigeo. “The Origins of the Pipa.” Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan. (Memoirs of the Toyo Bunko). Second series, vol. 19 (1940): 259-304.

• Kuang Yuzhong 邝宇忠 . “Ershi shiji houbanye pipa de sanxiang zhongda gaige” 20世纪后半叶琵琶的三项重大改革 (Three great reforms of the pipa in the latter half of the 20th century). Renmin yinyue (人民音乐) 2003:11:28-30.

• Lin Shicheng. 2000a. “Pipa de xingcheng yu fazhan: Lin Shicheng jiang pipa, di er jiang” (The formation and development of the pipa: Lin Shicheng’s talks on the pipa, talk 2). Yueqi kanshou 2000:2: 50-51.

• Ma Zhuanjing, “Fantan pipa shuo kaifang.” (‘Playing the Pipa behind the Back’ to discuss opening up).Qiushi (Seeking Truth) 1994: 13: 36-41.

• Myers, John. The Way of the Pipa: Structure and Imagery in Chinese Lute Music. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1992.

• Picken, Laurence. “The Origin of the Short Lute.” The Galpin Society Journal. 8 (1955): 32–42.

• Robinson, Kenneth and Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, 4, pt. 1 (1962): 182. [on temperament and introduction of Indian modes associated with the wuxian pipa to China.]

• Van Gulick, Robert Hans. The Lore of the Chinese Lute. 2nd rev. edition. Rutland, VT and Tokyo: Charles Tuttle and Sophia University, 1969. [Despite the title, this book concerns the guqin 古琴, not the pipa.]

• Wolpert, Rembrant F. “The Five-stringed Lute in East Asia.” Musica Asiatica 3 (1981): 97-106.

• Wu Man. “The Pipa: Its Past, Present and Potential,” Music from China Newsletter 4/1 (1995), online version, www.musicfromchina.org.

• Zhang Jingyuan. “Lun pipa de chansheng ji qi fazhan” (on the pipa’s creation and development). Xihua daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban). 2006 (April): no. 2: 98-100.

• Zhou Dafeng. “Minzu yueqi de gaige.” [Reform of national instruments]. Yueqi yanjiu [Musical instrument research]

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Paper Boy: A contemporary composition for the guzheng

Wu Fei Paper Boy

This track is Paper Boy, composed and performed on the guzheng by Wu Fei:



You can buy Paper Boy as a single on Amazon and iTunes (for 99 cents).

• See also The guzheng on Danwei.

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The guzheng

Wu Fei playing guzheng

The guzheng is a 21-stringed zither that has been played in China – in one form or another – for about two thousand years. Aside from having 21 strings (compared to the guqin‘s 7 strings), the guzheng’s other major difference from the guqin is that there are bridges: This means that the left hand can change pitches by bending the strings up and down, whereas the guqin changes pitches by a horizontal motion like a slide guitar.

In the video below, Wu Fei introduces the guzheng and performs the Fishermans’ Evening Song or Fisherman’s Serenade (渔舟唱晚), which was rearranged from its folk origins and standardized into the repertoire by Lou Shuhua.

You can also watch the video on Tudou (accessible on China’s eunuch Internet) and Youtube (blocked in China but sometimes faster than Vimeo).

More about the Guzheng and Wu Fei
Wikipedia: The guzheng
Danwei: Paper Boy: A contemporary composition for the guzheng;
Interview with Wu Fei in 2007 (also on Tudou)
Wu Fei’s website. 
Youtube:
 Akramachamarei from John Zorn’s Xaphan: The Book of Angels (Massada series) performed by Secret Chiefs 3 with Wu Fei on guzheng.
Philmutic: Guzheng
Melody of China: Guzheng

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